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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Appellant has at every opportunity demanded his unalien-
able rights at all times and not waived his rights at any time 
including his right to time. He has denied the lower courts 
jurisdiction in this matter because it was a matter of rights. His 
demand for proof of the lower court's jurisdiction has been ignored 
along with his rights as a Free Citizen. The arresting officer has 
lied on the citations, on the witness stand and even changed his 
testimony from the Precinct Court to the Circuit Court. When he 
was questioned about the facts of the case, he purposely avoided 
the facts that would prove his false-swearing. Judge Alfred C. 
VanWagenen has, at every opportunity, tried to harm the Appellant's 
case, cause him anguish, deny him his common unalienable rights and 
deny him due process of law in the court. 
When two persons disagree with the events, the facts should 
be reviewed and when there is found contradictions and 
discrepancies in the testimony and the records of the police 
officers, there is no proof beyond reasonable doubt. 
It should be noted that the Appellant is appearing in Propria 
Persona, or in proper person, not Pro Se. The Appellant has not 
appeared in any of the lower courts as an attorney. The Appellant 
is not an attorney and has never acted a one, he has merely 
appeared as a proper person in his own defense. He, therefore, 
cannot be held to the same standards as an attorney or officer of 
the court (See Bouvier's Law Dictionary). 
With these "facts" in mind, the Appellant submits the 
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jurisdiction of this case to the Utah Court of Appeals, praying for 
justice, due process and protection of his rights. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. The issue of jurisdiction was never addressed by the 
prosecution or the court, even when the Appellant raised the 
question. The Appellant demands all of his rights and waives none. 
2. Utah Code 46-6-46, under which the Appellant was charged, 
is in contradiction to UC 46-6-47 and 48. UC 46-6-46 is unclear 
and unconstitutional. 
3. Motion for right "Sua Sponte" were denied. 
4. Demand for Counsel of Choice was denied. 
5. Art. Ill, Sec. 2 of the U. S. Constitution states that the 
Supreme Court of the United States shall have original jurisdiction 
of all cases in which the state shall be a party. 
6. If this case is a criminal matter and the state is 
bringing the charge against a Free Citizen, then the matter belongs 
in a Common Law Court with a 12 man jury of his peers. The Court 
never denied the Appellant's Free Citizen status. 
7. Could it be a crime when there was no loss, damage, 
injury, harm or trespass against another's rights? There was no 
intent and no complaint signed by the injured party, because there 
was no injured party. 
8. There was no reliable witness. Magna Carta Article #38 
and #45. 
9. Florida v. Ana Aquilera and consolidated cases consisting 
of an investigation by the County Court of 80 speeding cases, 
expenditure of $75,000, testimony from numerous qualified 
witnesses, resulting in 33 exhibits and in excess of 2,000 pages 
of transcript evidence proving that RADAR devices cannot lawfully 
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present "evidence" against citizens because of manifest and 
multiple errors, deficiencies, lack of scientific certainty and 
lack of reliability in a court; was thrown out by the Clearfield 
Circuit Court. 
10. The Appellant was denied due process when he requested 
discovery of RADAR manual and specifications and was denied by the 
Judge even though it was demanded by motion at least three times. 
11. The Appellant requests the Court of Appeals to review the 
motions presented to the court to see if there is any validity or 
deserve consideration on appeal. 
12. The Appellant was denied the right to voir dire the 
prospective jurors. The Judge often changed the questions to suit 
himself when the Appellant presented a question. 
13. The Appellant was denied his right to challenge for cause 
and have prospective jurors dismissed who had admitted to being 
prejudiced against him. None were dismissed even though one argued 
against the Appellant for several minutes. 
14. The Appellant's jury instructions were denied. Some 
consisted of Constitutional provisions plus State and Federal 
Supreme Court case law. 
15. When the Appellant demanded a jury trial, the Judge 
denied it at first then relented providing the Appellant put up 
$300 bail or a $600 property bond. The Appellant argued the 
decision and finally the Judge relented to no bond. The threat of 
this bail (10 times the normal fine) seems to exceed the 
protections set forth in the 8th Amendment in the Bill of Rights. 
This was probably the only point won by the Appellant in the 
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Clearfield Court. 
16. The evidence documented at the scene was in conflict with 
the testimony of the officers. The officer's story in the Precinct 
Court was totally different than in the Circuit Court. 
17. From the first motion hearing, the attitude of the Judge 
was one of contempt and scorn for the Appellant. Almost none of 
his oral arguments were allowed. The Judge was the adversary and 
carried the prosecution over 90 percent of the time during this 
entire case. 
18. BAKER'S Affidavit of Impecuniosity was denied even though 
all the evidence entered into the court showed that he was. There 
was no evidence supporting the court's decision. 
19. Transcripts of the trial was denied BAKER even though the 
Utah Constitution Art. I, Sec. 12, states: "In no instance shall 
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance 
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed." 
20. Even though the Appellant had submitted a "Notice of 
Appeal" and a "Stay of Execution Pending Appeal" to the Court, the 
Judge placed BAKER under arrest at the Sentencing Hearing and BAKER 
was compelled to pay the $30 fine or go to prison. 
21. A sentence of 20 days in prison or $40 fine for 
travelling 71 mph in a 55 mph zone is a little much when the 
Appellant had only one other ticket in the last three years. Could 
it be said that he wanted to catch BAKER without the cash on him? 
22. If evidence is rejected by the court or not allowed to 
be presented in court, can that evidence be used in the appeal? 
23. The seizure of the Appellant was a violation of his 
Fourth Amendment rights as held in Brown v. Texas, etc. 
24. The Appellant was not allowed to tell the jury that they 
had the right to determine the law and the fact. 
The officer's notes, consisting of several pages supposedly 
taken at the scene of the crime, was denied the Appellant for his 
use at the trial. 
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AFFIDAVIT OF IMPECUNIOUSITY 
I, L.D. BAKER, do solemnly affirm that owing to my 
poverty, I am unable to bear the expenses of portecting 
myself in these legal proceedings which are about to com-
mence, and that"! verily believe I am justly entitled to the 
relief sought by such action. 
Subscribed and sworn before me on this /£//# 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On the 16th of February, 1987, appellant BAKER was traveling 
north on 1-15 through the Centerville area. BAKER was stopped and 
charged with doing 71 mph in an area posted at 55 mph. 
The case was tried in the Davis County Precinct Court with 
Judge John D. Stewart presiding, and BAKER was found guilty. The 
case was appealed to the Clearfield Circuit Court. (Meanwhile, 
about ten days after the Precinct Court Trial, the same officer 
followed BAKER for five miles and arrested him again for doing 65 
mph in a 55 mph posted area on U. S. 89. As the officer approached 
BAKER, he said that he was going to teach him a lesson.) The 71/65 
case was tried in the Clearfield Court with Judge Alfred C. 
VanWagener presiding with a four person jury. BAKER was found 
guilty. 
BAKER, who has insufficient funds to sustain himself, could 
not pay for the transcripts for his appeal. He has filed an 
Affidavit of Impecuniosity and demanded the transcripts of the 
case. The Court of Appeals accepted the Affidavit, but mistakenly 
ordered the City of Clearfield to pay for the Transcripts. Judge 
VanWagener demonstrated his bias and prejudice against BAKER in his 
letter informing the Court of Appeals that the city of Clearfield 
was not involved. The Judge insisted that BAKER was not 
impecunious, in his opinion, and was only a trouble making 
Constitutionalist trying to cost the government money. The Court 
of Appeals vacated their ruling of impecuniosity and remanded the 
decision back to good old Judge VanWagener. Of course, the Judge 
found that BAKER was not impecunious, without any evidence 
presented to substantiate that ruling. All the information entered 
into evidence represented that BAKER was impecunious. 
The Appellant, Mr. BAKERf is presenting this brief without the 
benefit of the transcripts, even though they are of substantial 
importance in this case. BAKER is still in no position to pay for 
the transcripts and hereby certifies that he is still impecunious. 
FACT 
Article I, Section 12, The Utah State Constitution states. 
"In no instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the 
rights herein guaranteed." 
The transcripts cannot be denied BAKER in his quest to prove his 
innocence, if the Utah Constitution is still valid. Is it? 
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THE SCENE OF THE CRIME 
BAKER was traveling in the inside lane (left) of the three 
northbound lanes of 1-15 on the 16th of February, 1987, through 
Centervillef Utah. It was after 10 p.m. and on a very dark night. 
BAKER had followed in that left lane since Bountiful, about three 
miles back. When there was an opportunity for the car ahead to 
move into the middle lane, BAKER flashed his lights and the vehicle 
moved over. BAKER set his cruise control on 62 mph. Several years 
ago the Colonel of the Highway Patrol stated on radio that no one 
would be bothered unless they exceeded 62 mph. BAKER had used that 
as a guide and had traveled alongside many Utah Highway Patrol 
(UHP) vehicles without any challenges for several years. 
Unknown to BAKER, the group of cars was a log-jam of twenty 
to twenty-five vehicles caused by a UHP vehicle setting the pace 
at about 55 or 56 mph. The middle lane was solid with cars 40 feet 
to 50 feet apart. The outside lane was also quite busy. The left 
lane, in which BAKER was traveling, had one vehicle about 800 feet 
ahead of him and traveling at about the same speed. It should be 
pointed out here that when the cars are slowed down from their 
normal speed, they tend to bunch up and follow too closely. 
According to anyone with traffic engineering experience, this 
condition could result in multiple car accidents if anyone makes 
a mistake. The car following may be able to stop or avoid the car 
in trouble, but the second or third cannot avoid them, therefore, 
a serious accident results. 
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The police officer admits to "moderate heavy" traffic 
conditions on his citation. This was the only place on 1-15 
between Provo and Farmington where BAKER had encountered dense 
traffic that evening. The officer checked that it was "dry," 
"dark," "none" passengers and that the conditions of the violator 
was "calm." The officer's comments were that the violator was "250 
(feet?) distance" or "about 1/8 mile." All of those comments are 
stipulated to except that 1/8 mile is 660 feet not 250 feet. He 
claimed in court that he could judge the speed of a vehicle within 
1 mph at 300 feet away without any difficulty. Each 1 mph would 
be 1.5 feet every second; that is good estimating. If he cannot 
estimate the distance of a vehicle closer than between 250 feet and 
1/8 mile (660 feet) and believes they are approximately the same, 
there has to be a problem. 
One of the lies told by the officer on the second Citation 
(issued to BAKER shortly after the Precinct Trial on this case) was 
that: "I problem the last time I cited this man." This indicates 
that he claimed on the second Citation that BAKER had caused him 
trouble when he was stopped for this first Citation. There appears 
to be no indication of any problem on this Citation, nor was there 
anything said at the Precinct Trial. Such a statement on a 
Citation appears to be in violation of Utah Code, Sections 76-8-
201 Official Misconduct; 76-8-502 False or inconsistent material 
statements; 76-8-503 False or inconsistent statements; 76-8-504 
Written false statements; 76-8-505 Perjury or false swearing-proof 
of falsity of statements. The witness is his own written 
statements on the Citations. The officer also violated 76-8-511 
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Falsification or alteration of government record. His checking the 
"moderate" traffic conditions on the second citation when there was 
not another vehicle within 1/2 mile was another outright lie. 
These facts can be verified by the citations and by UDOT traffic 
engineer. 
The above may not pertain to this case, but it does refer to 
this case and it proves the officer will lie to prove a person 
guilty, just like he did when he accused BAKER of traveling 71 mph 
in this instant case. 
Continuing with the facts at the scene of the crime as BAKER 
saw them. BAKER had traveled a mile or so at 62 mph in the left 
lane, gaining on the vehicles in the middle lane at about 5 or 6 
mph, or about seven feet per second. It took about ten seconds to 
gain 60 or 70 feet, the distance between vehicles plus their 
length. In the rear view mirror BAKER noticed a vehicle in his 
lane about 500 feet behind him because of the bright lights of the 
car. BAKER noticed that the car was traveling very fast, passing 
the cars in the middle lane at the rate of one every three seconds 
or so. The car had to be traveling about 40 mph faster than the 
cars in the middle lane, or about 100 mph. BAKER gradually merged 
into the middle lane to let him pass. The vehicle from behind did 
not come within 200 feet of BAKER before BAKER had merged into the 
middle lane. 
The speeding vehicle pulled up alongside BAKER and flashed the 
red and blue lights, signaling BAKER to move over to the outside 
shoulder and stop. That is precisely what BAKER did. Sgt. Owen 
Busch, Badge #63 was the arresting officer and Patrolman Lloyd 
5 
Michaud, Badge #384 was with him. 
Sgt. Busch was the only officer to come to the Precinct trial. 
He testified that he had shot BAKER1 s car with RADAR, then clocked 
him to verify the speed. 
This testimony bothers BAKER, because BAKER knew that from 500 
to 600 feet back the police car had been going close to 100 mph and 
there was no way for the police to clock a car without going the 
exact same speed. The testimony that Busch had shot BAKER'S car 
with RADAR had to be answered in the Trial de Novo. BAKER scoured 
the area for RADAR experts and found several, but they need the 
specifications and manual for the specific RADAR gun used. BAKER 
wrote several letters to the Circuit Court demanding discovery of 
the information. BAKER'S demand for discovery was blatantly 
denied. He also had demanded the transcripts of the Motion 
Hearing, since he could not remember clearly all that had taken 
place. They were denied BAKER also. 
One week before the trial, it became clear from the Judge's 
letter that BAKER was not going to get the specifications on the 
RADAR. BAKER talked to P.O.S.T. who teaches the police officers. 
Mr. Earl Morris, who teaches clocking of vehicles and Lt. Ben 
Lemmon of the U. of U. Police, who teaches RADAR at P.O.S.T. were 
subpoenaed on Monday morning and the trial was the next Friday. 
Neither man showed up in court. The Salt Lake City Sheriff was 
apparently unsuccessful at delivering the subpoenas, even though 
both men were in and out of their offices all week long. 
BAKER'S purpose for inviting these men was to bring out the 
facts and the truth. Morris laughed when he was told about Busch* s 
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testimony. Patrolman Michaud was also subpoenaed, and he showed 
up. 
What bothered BAKER the whole time between the trial was: How 
did Busch shoot the RADAR 250 or 300 feet down the left traffic 
lane and hit the smallest car on the road, yet miss the eight or 
ten cars to the side in the middle lane within six feet of the line 
of sight and miss the oncoming traffic and trucks in the southbound 
lanes just 40 feet to the left of BAKER, when the RADAR usually 
has a beam about 15 degrees wide? 
Between the court denying BAKER the RADAR specifications, the 
S.L.C. Sheriff not delivering the subpoenas and the fact that Busch 
changed his entire testimony in the Circuit Court, which was then 
supported by Michaud, BAKER had his hands full. He did not need 
the harassment by the Judge. 
Now, here is the testimony of Busch in the new trial. Busch 
was in the right lane (causing the log-jam of cars) when he noticed 
BAKER'S car in the left lane going faster than the cars in the 
middle lane. Both Busch and Michaud testified that the traffic was 
heavy, or at least "moderate heavy." 
Everyone who has driven on 1-15 knows that when cars are 
bunched up in a log-jam at 55 mph, the middle lane is always 
solidly packed and usually the left lane is also. Every observer 
of log-jam must admit that the vehicles travel within 40 or 50 feet 
of each other and many times closer than that. 
Busch testified that he was going 55 mph when he moved to the 
middle lane where he picked up speed to match BAKER'S speed. Then 
he shot his RADAR on the ground in front of him to verify his 
7 
speed. Busch and Michaud testified that the BAKER'S vehicle was 
at least 250 to 300 feet in front of them in the left lane while 
they were clocking him from the middle lane. (Remember that Busch 
thought that BAKER was also about 1/8 mile away, which is 660 
feet.) 
Sixty mph is equal to 88 feet per second; therefore, one mph 
equals 1.47 feet per second, say 1.5 feet per second. If BAKER was 
traveling at 71 mph, he must have been doing 16 mph (or 24 feet per 
second) faster than all of the other vehicles on the road. That 
is Busch's testimony. Busch claimed that he adjusted his speed to 
BAKER'S at 71 mph. Busch would not say how long it took his car 
to catch up to 71 mph speed, but he did testify that he did and 
could easily adjust his speed to BAKER'S and clock him within one 
and one-half to two seconds. Busch would have to be busy to see 
a car, say 300 feet away in another lane, check his own 
speedometer, shot his RADAR on the ground, confirm the RADAR 
reading with his own speedometer and verify again that he is 
exactly the same speed as BAKER in "moderate heavy" traffic 
conditions on a very dark night when all he could possibly see 
would be BAKER'S tail lights. All in one and one-half to two 
seconds? You be the judge. 
When Busch was traveling in the middle lane (which was solid 
with cars bunched up close together), it must have taken three or 
four seconds to pick up speed from 55 mph to 71 mph, let us say 
three seconds. Remember, 16 mph is 24 feet per second. The first 
second he must have gained about 8 feet on the car in front of him, 
the second second he must have gained about 16 feet and the third 
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second he must have gained about 20 feet; for a total of 44 feet. 
If he took two seconds to clock BAKER, that is another 48 feet for 
a total of 92 feet he had gained on the car in front of him. Then 
he shot his RADAR on the ground, which he said took only about 50 
feet to miss the car in front; for a grand total of 142 feet. What 
happened to all of the cars in the middle lane? Did they disappear 
when Busch decided to pursue BAKER? Why did Busch not run into 
three cars ahead of him in his lane? Both officers agree as to how 
they clocked BAKER. You be the judge? 
When Busch is traveling the middle lane behind a car 50 feet 
in front of him, his head is about two feet inside his car. If he 
follows directly behind the car in front, the left side of the car 
in front tends to block his vision of the lane on his left at a 
ratio of 2 feet to 50 feet or 1:25. If BAKER'S car is 300 feet 
ahead in the left lane, Busch could only see an object 12 feet left 
of the car in front of him 300 feet away. Divide 25 into 300 
equals 12. In plain words, Busch could not even see BAKER'S car. 
Suppose that Busch moved his car out of line where he could 
see BAKER clearly. This would conflict with BAKER'S testimony, in 
that all of the cars in the middle lane, at least eight in a row, 
were all in line as shown by their headlights in his rear view 
mirror. Eight cars spaced at 60 feet would be 480 feet. The 
speeding car was first noticed when it was at least that far back. 
Anyway, if Busch moved his car left two feet, he could have 
clearly seen the tail lights of BAKER'S car. Michaud, in the 
passenger's side, also testifies that he verified the clock from 
his position, which was at least three feet to the right of Busch. 
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The ratio of 3 feet in 50 feet (if they ever got within 50 feet of 
the car ahead of them) is 1:16.6. Michaud could not see an object 
at 300 feet away unless it was more than 18 feet left of the car 
ahead. Again, you be the judge. It was a very dark night. There 
was a log-jam of cars all doing 55 mph, moderate heavy traffic and 
the middle lane was, as always, the most heavily packed. Does the 
Court of Appeals surmise that maybe Superman could have clocked 
BAKER under these conditions and within the one and one-half 
seconds. 
BAKER recognizes that a person can be trained to estimate the 
speed of vehicles that can be clearly seen when viewed from a point 
that is off-to-the-side, where the speed of the vehicle can be 
compared to stationary objects and the ground nearby. But any man 
who says that he can estimate the speed of a car in less than two 
seconds within one mph or even 5 mph from a point 300 feet behind 
the car in another lane traveling directly away from him on a very 
dark night when only the tail lights can be seen is a superman of 
a DAMNED LIAR. You be the judge. 
If the Court of Appeals could get their hands on the tapes, 
they may be able to recognize the methods Busch used to avoid 
answering the questions that would put these facts before the 
court. In the Precinct Court on the second Citation, BAKER was 
determined to get the answers to his questions from Busch in cross 
examination. BAKER was found in Contempt of Court for demanding 
that he get an answer to his questions. Busch avoided all the 
questions that were significant to the defense. BAKER was told, 
"That is the way it is. Why don't you give up.M 
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What makes it even more cozy is that there was no doubt in 
BAKER'S mind or in the minds of the other persons who attended the 
Circuit Court trial that both the Judge and the Prosecutor were 
aware of the Officer's avoidance of the questions, that there were 
questions about his veracity and that the truth was purposely 
denied the jury by one method or another. How much training as a 
trial lawyer or Judge does it take to recognize that? The Judge's 
letter of December 29, 1987 is proof of his disgust and prejudice 
toward BAKER, BAKER had read the Organic Law and many court cases 
and decided that he had rights and immunities and did not have to 
put up with liars and bullies who find protection and a steady 
salary in law enforcement. BAKER is not anti-police or anti-
courts, he just wants them to tell the truth and obey the law 
themselves. No citizen should have to put up with anything less. 
It should be pointed out that not one of BAKER'S motions on 
any point was answered or responded to by the prosecution. Of 
course, maybe the prosecutor does not have to answer if he has a 
"friend in the court." At the end of the motion hearing, BAKER 
walked to the prosecutor and congratulated him on a job "well done" 
saying, "Bill, you have won on every point without opening your 
mouth. How do you do that?" Bill's answer was silence, but what 
can a man say when he is that good. Retraction: Bill did say that 
he did not know BAKER and had no reason to believe that BAKER would 
not show up for the jury trial when the Judge tried to slap a $300 
bail or @600 property bond on BAKER. Other than that, BAKER does 
not recall him opening his mouth. 
JURISDICTION 
The Constitution of the United States, Article III, Section 
2 states: 
"The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the 
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under their authority;...to controversies between two or more 
States;...and between a State, or Citizens thereof, and 
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
MIn all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and consuls and those in which a State shall be a 
party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction." 
(Underlining mine) 
This case is between a State and a Citizen, it would appear 
to the Appellant that the Supreme Court should have jurisdiction. 
The case of City of Salina v. Wisden, 57 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, appealed 
to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah; fails as justification 
when used as a Jurisdictional argument in this situation and with 
this defendant for several reasons. 
The case states "In order for our scheme of ordered liberties 
to succeed, we must all obey valid laws, even those with which we 
do not agree;" I take it that "valid" means laws pertaining to me. 
It is a valid law that "all persons register at the nearest post 
office" for some people aliens. "All persons must register for the 
draft" is a valid law. But do they pertain to me? 
Valid statutes are those that are not repugnant to the Law; 
meaning the Organic Law as found in Volume I of the U. S. Code. 
Those statutes that do not have roots in the Organic Law are null 
and void per the U. S. Supreme Court. No statutes may violate my 
unalienable rights or immunities. 
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The state, county and municipalities may, "under its police 
power, regulate in the interest of the public safety and welfare: 
but it may not arbitrarily or unreasonably prohibit or restrict 
it." (THOMPSON v. Smith) 154 S.E. 579, 583. In the higher courts 
opinion, it is "Search and Seizure" under the Fourth Amendment when 
any police officer stops a "Citizen" and there is no substance to 
his "Charge." No loss, victim, intent or crime. 
"But whenever the operation and effect of any general 
regulation is to extinguish or destroy that by which the law 
of the land is the property of any person, so far as it has 
that effect: it is considered as being deprivation of property 
within the meaning of this Constitutional guarantee if it 
deprives an owner of one of its essential attributes, destroys 
its value, restricts or interrupts its common, necessary or 
profitable use, hampers the owner in the application of it to 
the purposes of trade, or imposes conditions upon the right 
to hold, or use it and thereby seriously impairs its value." 
(16 AM JUR. 2d, Const. Law Section 369). 
If there is damage, loss, trespass of rights, victim and 
intent, there may have been a crime committed which calls for an 
investigation, etc. If there is no crime (i.e., intent, damage and 
victim being necessary to constitute a crime), there may be a civil 
matter and the victim or damaged person must make a complaint. 
In the Salina case there is a statement, "The right to travel 
granted by the state and federal constitutions does not include the 
ability to ignore laws governing the use of public roadways." 
Where in any organic law (including both state and federal 
constitutions) is the "right to travel" granted to "Citizens"? The 
Declaration of Independence, Articles of Confederation, Ordinance 
of 1787: The Northwest Territorial Government of the U. S. 
Constitution (which constitute the Organic Law of the land and 
found in Volume I of the U. S. Code in front of Title I) did not 
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grant us the "right to travel." We always had that right. The 
states granted that right to Corporations and regulated industries 
that act or use the roads and other public facilities as a matter 
of "privilege" and use the public roads and other public facilities 
for profit or gain in a mercantile pursuit, supposedly for the 
public good. 
"The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and 
to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of 
life and business is a common right which he has under right 
to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, 
and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right in 
so doing to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day; 
and under the existing modes of travel includes the right to 
drive a horse-drawn carriage or wagon thereon, or to operate 
an automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary purposes of 
life and business. It is not a mere privilege, like the 
moving of a house in the street, operating a business stand 
in the street, which a city may permit or prohibit at will." 
(Thompson v. Smith) 154 S.E. 579, 583 
The Constitution did not give us our "common rights," they 
merely helped preserve them and reinforced our immunities from an 
arbitrary government or police power. 
"He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither 
swarms of Officers to harass our people, and eat out their 
substance." (Declaration of Independence) Organic Law. 
Did we win that war?? -- Then we have those immunities!! 
"We are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction 
in this particular between an individual and a corporation, 
and that the latter has no right to refuse to submit its books 
and papers for an examination at the suit of the State. The 
individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a 
citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in 
his way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty 
to the State or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or 
to open his doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend 
to criminate him. He owes no duty to the State, since he 
receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life 
and property. His rights are such as existed by the law of 
the land long antecedent to the organization of the State, and 
can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in 
accordance with the Constitution. Among his rights are a 
refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself 
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and his property from arrest or seizure except under a warrant 
of the law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does 
not trespass upon their rights. 
"Upon the other hand, the corporation is creature of the 
State. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of 
the public. It receives certain special privileges and 
franchises and holds them subject to the laws of the State and 
the limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by 
law." (HALE v. HINKLE) 201 U.S. 43,74 
The Salina case continues: 
"The ability to drive a motor vehicle on a public roadway 
is not a fundamental right; it is a privilege that is granted 
upon the compliance with statutory licensing procedures and 
may be revoked." 
The Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 1914 Edition, used by Congress 
defines the difference between a DRIVER and a TRAVELER. 
(a) DRIVER: "One employed in conducting a coach, carriage, 
wagon, or other vehicle with horses, mules, or other 
animals." 
(b) EMPLOYED: "The act of doing a thing, and being under 
contract or orders to do it." 
(c) TRAVELER: "One who passes from place to place, whether 
for pleasure, instruction, business or health." 
When the court is referring to a "Driver" who is hired as a 
matter of contract to move freight for a profit on the public 
right-of-way, they know that he is "driving as a matter of 
privilege and not as a matter of right." 
There are over 80 cases by state Supreme Courts that state 
that: To travel is a common right. To stop me when there is no 
"crime," the government must have a civil right over me. The 
Organic Law states that law is established: 
"for extending the fundamental principles of civil and 
religious liberty, which form the basis whereon these 
republics, their laws and constitutions are erected; to fix 
and establish those principles as the basis of all laws 
constitutions and governments, which forever hereafter shall 
be formed in the said territory;" (Section 13, Northwest 
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Territorial Ordinance, Volume 1, U. S. Code.) 
Sovereignty over government is with the people. Sovereignty 
over the corporations, their drivers and all regulated industry who 
organize under the state statutes; is with the State. It is a 
creature created by the state. 
"Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it 
is the author and source of law; but in our system while 
sovereign powers are delegated to agencies of government, 
sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for 
whom all government exists and acts. And the Law is the 
definition and limitation of power." (of government) (Yick 
Wo v. Hopkins) 
"The sole object and only legitimate end of government is to 
protect the citizen in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and 
property; and when the government assumes other functions it 
is usurpation and oppression." (Alabama Constitution, Art. 
I, Sec. 35) 
Article VI, of The U. S. Constitution states: 
"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; shall be the supreme Law 
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State 
to the contrary notwithstanding." (U.S. Const. Art. VI) 
In Maxfield's Lessee v. Levy, the U. S. Supreme Court said: 
"No court in America ever yet thought, nor, I hope, ever will, 
or acquiring jurisdiction by fiction...it is evident that we 
are not to assume a voluntary jurisdiction, because we think, 
or others might think, it may be exercised innocently, or even 
wisely." (Maxfield's Lessee v. Levy, 4 U. S. 308, 311, 312) 
In Kemp v. Holt, the court ruled: 
"The words life, liberty and property are constitutional terms 
and are to be taken in the broadest sense. They indicate the 
three great subdivisions of all civil rights. The term 
property in this clause embraces all valuable interests which 
a man may possess outside of himself, and that is to say 
outside of his life and liberty. It is not confined to mere 
technical property, but literally to every species of vested 
right." (Kemp v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620) 
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To travel on the public right-of-ways is one of those common 
or un-alien-able rights. No government, constitution or law give 
the citizens those rights; the citizen has always had them. 
To save space, I refer the court to Marbury v. Madison (Cranch 
1, 60) pages 69, 72, 73 and 74. 
It is of utmost importance that my government obey the Organic 
Law of the United States "scrupulously," as stated by Justice 
Brandeis in Olmstead v. U. S. and quoted in Miranda v. Arizona. 
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STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code 41-C-46 states that: 
"(1) No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than 
is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having 
regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing." 
The Utah Code then lists seven or eight conditions that must 
be considered when a determination of what is reasonable and 
prudent is being adjudicated. None of these conditions existed on 
the road or at the scene in this case per the arresting officer. 
There was no intersection, railroad crossing, curve, hill, crest, 
narrow or winding road, pedestrians, bad weather or highway 
conditions that would cause a traveler to use extra-ordinary 
caution. 
The first question that must be raised is what is the enabling 
act for this statute? It can be found in the U. S. Code pertaining 
to the commerce and/or business titles not to citizens. The 
"person" can easily be construed to mean a creature, corporation 
or regulated industry who uses the road for profit and gain. See 
Hale v. Hinkle under Jurisdiction. 
The traffic regulations were established for two main reasons: 
(1) to allow the traffic to flow better, faster and in higher 
volumes, and (2) for the benefit of the insurance companies, whose 
profits and losses are based on traffic accidents, and so the 
courts and jury can fix the blame when there is a loss or injury. 
The U. S. Supreme Court ruled: 
"...The Constitution is the Supreme law of the land ordained 
and established by the people. All legislation must conform 
to the principles it lays down. When an act of Congress is 
appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to 
the constitutional mandate, the Judicial Branch of the 
government has only one duty, to lay the Article of the 
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Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is 
challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the 
former. All the court does or can do is announce its 
considered judgment upon the question*..Its delicate and 
difficult office is to ascertain and declare whether the 
legislation is in accordance with or in contravention of the 
provisions of the constitution; and having done that, its duty 
ends." (U. S. v. Butler, 56 S.Ct. 312 [1936]) 
Our government has hoped to stabilize all common laws, rights, 
immunities, acts and crimes so they can all be handled in a court 
of Equity. If it is not a crime, they figure out a way to make it 
one, so it can be handled as an Equity. When the state made or 
hatched the creatures or corporations and gave them "privileges," 
it worked so well that they decided to include the citizens in it. 
It has worked fairly well because most citizens have been brain 
washed into believing that they travel on the public right-of-ways 
as a matter of "privilege" not as a matter of "right." Is it a 
Right-of-way or a Privilege-of-way? Most citizens are in such a 
struggle to make a living and care for their families that they 
have not had time to look up and see what is happening. The 
lawyers and the public servants are minding the store and just 
about have it all under control. 
Back to the Stature; If the speed limit is "reasonable and 
prudent," the addition of a speed limit, such as 55 mph, is in 
conflict with it. There is no problem with the Appellant if the 
state forces all those creatures who use the road for profit and 
gain as a matter of privilege are restricted to the 55 mph speed 
limit. The creatures exist for the benefit of the public and are 
totally under the police power and the governmental control. 
Whereas the citizens become subject to the police power only when 
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they commit a crime (a real crime), or cause harm, loss, injury to 
someone or trespass upon another's right. 
As everyone knows, the 55 mph was an edict by the President 
of the United States, passed later by Congress, then forced upon 
the States and the people by blackmail, duress and coercion. This 
law made "criminals" out of 99 percent of the people who entered 
upon the highway. This method of taxing and collecting revenues 
cannot be constitutional because it is collected by the police 
power in the courts. There is, on the average, not one in one 
hundred vehicles that stays below the 55 mph maximum speed limit 
their whole trip. It is not dissimilar to the "king who had no 
clothes." How long will it take for someone to wake up and say, 
that is WRONG. Our children have grown up believing that there is 
nothing wrong with breaking a law., After all everyone does, even 
some judges. 
BAKER has one report by the Utah DOT, Traffic Safety Engineer 
that shows that the 55 mph did not save lives. In 1986, 160,000 
citations were issued. Using $30 per citation equals $3,800,000, 
only part of the out-of-pocket cost to the people and which is 
perhaps four times that in time and effort. This does not count 
the anguish caused by this ordeal. This situation could be looked 
at as a method of controlling the "sheeple" and training them to 
mind their masters, our public servants? Some individuals think 
they are goats, not sheep ready to be sheared. 
The Appellant attempted to submit a number of State Supreme 
Court cases as a defense and as jury instruction; they were all 
denied, mostly because they were cases from other states, according 
20 
to the prosecutor. 
State v. Trimming is an Idaho case in which the defendant was 
convicted in District Court of driving at a speed greater than was 
reasonable and prudent. Idaho Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction and Justice Smith wrote the majority opinion: 
" [5-7] I. C. Sec. 49-701 does not prohibit the driving in 
excess of the limits specified. But if one does so drive, 
then he must assume the burden of proving that in so driving 
he was not unreasonable or imprudent under the conditions to 
which the statute refers. And if his evidence shows that no 
condition existed either actual, potential, or at all, which 
would render his speed 'greater than is reasonable and 
prudent,1 then the burden of proof, of overcoming the prima 
facie presumption of unreasonable and imprudent driving, is 
fully met. There being no evidence of unreasonable or 
imprudent driving 'under the conditions' then appellant was 
entitled to acquittal of the charge of unreasonable and 
imprudent driving, as a matter of law, the evidence being 
insufficient, as a matter of law, to support the court's 
finding of unreasonable and imprudent driving 'under the facts 
as set forth in said stipulation.'" (Pages 121 and 122) 
(underline mine)(State v. Trimming, 406 P. 2d 118) 
In reversing a conviction, the Massachusetts Court, as quoted 
in State v. Trimming, said: 
"The real question in all these cases not is whether the speed 
is greater than was reasonable and proper, having regard to 
traffic and the use of the way and the safety of the public, 
the burden being on the rState] to show that it was. If the 
speed was such as to make out a prima facie case for the 
prosecution, still the burden does not change. The jury are 
to give due weight to the prima facie case taken in connection 
with the other circumstances disclosed by the testimony * * 
and if they are satisfied that the speed is greater than was 
reasonable and proper, having regard to traffic and the use 
of the way and the safety of the public, they should convict 
the defendant; otherwise they should acguit him. And hence 
in some cases a defendant may be convicted even if he has not 
exceeded the rate named in the prima facie clauses of the 
statute, and in some he may be acquitted even though he may 
have exceeded it." (95 N.E. at 215-216, a 1911 case 209 Mass. 
24, 95 N.E. 214)(State v. Trimming, 406 P. 2d, 118 [1965]) 
The Illinois Court, in reversing a judgment of conviction on 
a charge of having violated the posted speed limit, said: 
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"* * * Upon proof of driving at a speed in excess of the 
posted speed limits a rebuttable presumption is raised that 
the statute has been violated, and this presumption is 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case on the part of the 
State. The defendant may then introduce evidence to attack 
the basic fact upon which the presumption is based, that the 
defendant was driving at a speed in excess of the posted speed 
limits, or the defendant by his evidence may show that the 
conditions existing at the time and place of the arrest with 
reference to traffic condition of the roadway, etc., were such 
that he would be taken out of the purview of the statute. The 
State throughout the case has the duty of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt the defendant was driving at a speed in 
violation of the specific statutory provisions, and unless the 
State sustains that burden there should be a finding of not 
guilty. All that the presumption which is raised by a 
violation of the posted speed limit does is to create a prima 
facie case, and, standing alone and with no conflicting 
evidence, it would be sufficient to support a judgment. This 
presumption fails when the testimony of the State's witnesses 
is inconsistent with the presumption and in its very essence 
rebuts it," (This case is from People v. Perlman, 15 
Ill.App.2d 239, 145 N.E. 2d 76f2 [1957], involved title 49 of 
the Illinois Uniform Act Regulation Traffic, which contained 
provisions, including the prima facie evidence rule, similar 
to I.C. title 49-701 [and also Utah Code 41-6-46].) 
The Ohio Court in reversing a judgment of conviction on a 
charge laid under the statute, said: 
•»* * * merely to operate (a motor vehicle) outside of a 
municipality at a speed greater than 50 miles an hour is not 
a violation of the law that being only prima facie and the 
other provisions of the statute must be met as every person 
is presumed to be innocent until he is proven guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt of all the essential elements of the crime 
charged." State v. Hale 109 N.E.2d 590 
State v. Wall 115 Ohio App. 323, 185 N.E.2d 115 (1962) the 
Ohio Court stated in the headnote 185 N.E.2d at 125: 
"* * * we conclude that the gist of the offense is whether the 
speed in question is greater or less than is reasonable and 
proper under the conditions specified in Section 4511.21, 
supra, and that the particular speeds made prima facie lawful 
or unlawful are just what they are called, prima facie 
evidence to be considered along with the other evidence in the 
case in determining the ultimate question whether the speed 
is reasonable and proper." 
In considering the evidence the Court stated: 
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"* * * the great weight of the testimony is to the effect that 
it was not raining and had not been for several hours; that 
the road was dry; that it was wide and, there being no 
evidence to the contrary, may be assumed to be satisfactorily 
smooth; that there were no crossroads and in the entire three 
miles only three roads which dead end into Highway 257; that 
the speed traveled was between 55 and 60 miles an hour; that 
the motor vehicle was nearly new and in good condition; for 
which reason the judgment of conviction must be reversed upon 
the weight of the evidence." 
Olinvk v. People 642 P.2d 490 Colo (1981) "The effect of 
proof that a driver exceeded a prima facie speed limit is to 
raise a rebuttable presumption that the driver's speed 
exceeded what was reasonable or prudent under the 
circumstances. State v. Rich, 563 P.2d 918 (Ariz 1977). If, 
however, the driver's speed is the only evidence submitted by 
the prosecution, the defendant submits evidence sufficient to 
rebut the presumption of unreasonableness, a court may rule 
that defendant's speed, while in excess of the posted speed 
limit, was legal under the circumstances existing at the time. 
State v. Trimming, 89 Idaho 440, 406 P.2d 118 (1965)" 
Horslev v. Robinson 168 P. 2d 592 (1947) A Utah case, Justice 
Wade said, "What is a reasonable rate of speed under existing 
conditions must always be determined very largely on how much 
control the driver can maintain while driving at such rate." 
168 P.2d at 596 
Cardon v. Brenchlev 575 P. 2d 184 Decided in (1978). "The 
Plaintiff appealed the lower court's decision that there was 
no cause for action. The defendant's vehicle was traveling 
East on 900 South at 7500 West in Salt Lake City. The 
plaintiff's vehicle made a right hand turn onto 900 South and 
headed East in the right hand lane. The plaintiff signaled 
left and immediately turned into the left lane which is the 
lane that the defendant was travelling. The defendant was 
travelling at a rate of speed of 70 miles per hour. When the 
plaintiff turned onto 900 South the defendant started slowing 
and, at the point that the defendant's vehicle collided with 
the plaintiff's vehicle, the defendant was going at a rate of 
speed of 60 mph. 
"The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the 
lower court in not awarding damages to plaintiff. Phillip 
Fishier was the attorney for the defendant. In writing the 
majority opinion, Justice Crockett wrote: 
"(1) it is true that our statutes provide that driving 
in excess of certain stated speeds is prima facie evidence 
that such speed is greater than that which is reasonable and 
prudent under the circumstance; and it is also true that this 
may constitute prima facie evidence of negligence. However, 
that is not conclusive. The overriding principle governing 
negligence is the exercise of the degree of care which an 
ordinary, reasonable and prudent person would exercise under 
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the circumstances." (underlining mine) 
The Utah Supreme Court found no negligence on the part of the 
defendant even though there had been an accident and that the 
defendant was travelling faster than the posted speed. 
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RIGHTS MSUA SPONTI" 
Please see my motion in the case file. It was denied by the 
Circuit Court. If it is not in the case file, it will be furnished 
to the court. 
DEMAND FOR COUNSEL OF CHOICE 
Please see my motion in the case file. It was denied in 
Circuit Court. If it is not in the file, a copy will be furnished 
to the court. 
A man needs a "friend" or "counsel" to sit beside him during 
the frightening and intimidating ordeal of a trial, to listen, take 
notes, remind, calm the accused and be his friend. The friend 
should have the right to speak and help the Accused. Even the 1st 
Amendment allows people the right to free speech, assemble and 
petition the government for a redress of grievances. 
DEMAND FOR DISMISSAL -- NO RELIABLE WITNESS 
Please see my motion in the case file. It was denied in 
Circuit Court. If it is not in the file, a copy will be furnished 
to the court. 
The witnesses have proven that they were not "reliable," 
trustworthy, truthful, helpful or kind. Their integrity and 
veracity stinks and the courts are the only solution a citizen has 
to do something about it. That is my opinion at this time. The 
police know that their testimony weighs ten times more than the 
citizen in the eyes of the court. The citizen does not have much 
of a chance to prove his innocence and, if he tries or challenges 
25 
the police in court, the judge steps in on the side of the police. 
The Court of Appeals may say that it is not always true, but it 
happens too often. There were many war stories around; now I have 
seen it for myself. The Star Chamber Courts in action. 
Article #38 of the Magna Carta states to the effect that: 
MNo Officer, for the future, shall put any man to his law, 
upon his own simple affirmation, without credible witness 
produced for that purpose." 
and Article #45: 
"We will not make justiciaries, constables, sheriffs or 
officers, excepting of such as know the laws of the land and 
are well disposed to observe them." 
The Magna Carta was adjudicated by the U. S. Supreme Court as 
the origin of parts of the Constitution in Davidson v. New Orleans 
(96 U.S. 97) and many other citations. 
26 
JURY 
BAKER submitted a brief in support on Notice and Demand for 
Jury of 12. Please review the motion in the case file. Another 
copy is available if it is not in the case file. 
The Appellant believes that his rights and due process have 
been denied him by not being allowed to voir dire the prospective 
jurors, especially in this case. 
The Judge refused to ask some of BAKER'S questions, he changed 
others and, several times, denied follow-up on some of the answers 
given which was necessary to determine the attitude of the 
individual. The Judge acted like BAKER was a villain from whom he 
was protecting the jury. The Judge's attitude of disgust toward 
the Appellant brought out prejudiced feelings in the jury members. 
One question asked for BAKER showed prejudice in nine out of 
the eleven prospective jurors. Nine held up their hands as 
objecting to BAKER taking this case to court. BAKER challenged 
them for cause, but the Judge refused to remove any of them. BAKER 
demanded that they be polled to determine their attitude. The 
Judge refused, at first, then relented and asked each of them if 
they would please admit that BAKER had a right to have his case 
heard in court. Several still objected, but the "good" Judge 
coaxed them into submission. One man argued with the Judge for 
several minutes and BAKER insisted that he be removed for cause. 
The "good" Judge, in all of his wisdom, decided that none of the 
people would be challenged for cause. 
If a juror is not convinced that the Accused is innocent at 
the first of the trial, it may take somewhat less than "proof 
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beyond and reasonable doubt" to sway him to the verdict of guilty. 
Let it be known that this group of jurors were fairly well 
convinced by the Judge that BAKER was guilty at the outset. They 
were willing to let BAKER have his day in court as a favor to the 
Judge. 
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FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
The Fourth Amendment rights of the Appellant were violated 
when he was stopped by the police officer. The charge of speeding 
was false and there was no reasonable suspicion to believe that the 
Appellant was involved in a crime. 
"Held: The application of the Texas Statute to detain 
appellant and require him to identify himself violated the 
Fourth Amendment because the officers lacked any reasonable 
suspicion to believe that appellant was engaged or had engaged 
in criminal conduct, detained appellant to require him to 
identify himself constituted a seizure of his person subject 
to the requirement of the Fourth Amendment that the seizure 
be 'reasonable. ' ff (cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1; U. S. v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 US 873; BROWN v. TEXAS, 443 US 47. 
"All laws which are repugnant to the Constitution are null and 
void." Marbury v. Madison, 5 US (1 cranch) 137, 175. 
Recommended reading 162-178. 
The police officers took an oath to uphold and support the 
Constitutions of the United States and of the State of Utah. The 
purpose of those constitutions was to set up a form of government 
that would protect the rights and immunities the people already 
had. The unalienable rights are property just as much as a parcel 
of land, a house or a car. To uphold and protect the Constitutions 
is to protect and uphold the common law and unalienable rights of 
each and every citizen. It is not to act as a collector of 
revenues for the government. 
"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there 
can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate 
them." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 438, 491. 
"The people themselves have in their power effectively to 
resist usurpation, without being driven to an appeal in arms. 
An act of usurpation is not obligatory; it is not law; and any 
man is justified in his resistance.* * *" 2 Elliot's Debates. 
94; 2 Bancroft, History of the Constitution, 267. 
"Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government 
officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that 
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are commands to the Citizens. In a government of laws, 
existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to 
observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, 
the omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the 
whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the 
government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the 
law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it 
invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the 
criminal law the end justifies the means.. .would bring 
terrible retribution. Against the pernicious doctrine this 
Court should resolutely set its face." Olmstead v. U.S. 
(dicta); Miranda v. Arizona, 277 U.S. 438, 485; 48 S.Ct. 564, 
575. 
The ACCUSED firmly believes that those public servants who 
have taken an oath to uphold the Constitution and obey the law of 
the land should know the "law of the land" and obey it to the 
letter of that law. 
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UTAH STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
Since the outset of this case, many of the Appellant's rights, 
identified in the Utah State Constitution Article I, have been 
violated. 
Section 1. His inherent and inalienable rights have been 
totally ignored by the police officer, prosecutor and the Courts. 
Defence of liberties and property, protest against wrings and 
petition for redress of grievances have been impaired to the point 
that it is almost impossible to do so. Very likely, a citizen will 
end up in jail. 
Section 2. Appellant has not had equal protection under the 
law, the Organic Law. That is the Law of the Land, is it not? 
Section 3. The Appellant's rights under the U. S. 
Constitution have been denied. 
Section 7. Do the courts recognize "due process of law"? It 
was denied at almost every point in the trial and hearings. From 
jury selection, evidence placed before the court, false charges, 
denial of discovery, lack of substantial evidence against 
Appellant, false testimony on part of police, denial of motions for 
rights and threatened jail sentence were all violations of due 
process. 
Section 9. Excessive bail was threatened. If Judge had not 
relented, there would have been no trial. 
Section 10. This, being a criminal case between the State and 
a citizen, a jury of twelve is required. 
Section 11. If these courts are open, the Appellant does not 
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know what open means. The courts actually punish, intimidate and 
coerce the people who try to defend their rights and property. The 
wrath of the court was upon the Appellant from the time the 
Appellant stated that he was a "free citizen." 
Section 12. There were no reliable witnesses against the 
Appellant. They have been shown to lie without compunction. 
Section 14. Are people secure when a "law" is passed making 
99 percent of them guilty of a crime every time they enter upon the 
public right-of-way of the Interstate System. The Interstate was 
designed for 70 mph and the engineering studies show that 70 mph 
was a safe speed? 
Section 15. The jury shall have the right to determine the 
law and the fact? The court denied this and stopped the Appellant 
from saying anything about it. Is that denial of due process and 
this provision or is it "just the way it is"? 
Section 18. No Bill of Attainder? The high courts ruled that 
for non-capital crimes, it was called Bill of Pains and Penalties. 
The Appellant still has many emotional bruises from his experience. 
Section 21. To stop the Appellant without cause, deny him the 
use of his vehicle, deny him the right-of-way for carrying on his 
personal business and claim civil and criminal authority over him, 
is the "essence of slavery itself." (Yick Wo) 
Section 24. The laws and the courts do not have uniform 
operation. If a man claims his rights in the courts, he will get 
the full bias and prejudice of the court. 
Section 25. The people have rights? Tell it to the judge and 
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see where you get. You get the full wrath of the court upon you. 
Section 27. "Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles 
is essential to the security of individual rights and the 
perpetuity of free government." Why is the Appellant the only one 
who believes that??? 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Appellant was never travelling at any speed greater than 
62 or 63 mph, the cruise control was set at 62 mph and the 
speedometer has a full half circle diameter and easily read. 
In today's traffic the Appellant would be the slowest car on 
this stretch of 1-15. 
The Officer could not have clocked the Appellant for many 
reasons. 
A. The Appellant did not go that fast. 
B. The Officer's speed was 30 mph to 40 mph faster than the 
Appellant when the vehicles were within 400 feet of each 
other. 
C. The Officer lied when he said that he could clock a car 
to within one mph or even 5 mph from 250 feet behind, in 
another lanef on a very dark night and the car going 
directly away from him with no stationary objects to 
relate to and read his RADAR; all within two seconds. 
One mph would be 1.5 feet every second. Three feet 
difference would be 1.2 percent of 250 feet for the two 
seconds. 
D. The Officer lied when he said he did all of this from the 
middle lane which was stacked with cars no more than 50 
feet apart. He would have rear-ended at least three cars 
in his lane. 
E. Officer Michaud supported Busch's testimony, admitted 
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that the traffic was heavy, yet we know that he could not 
have seen the Appellant's vehicle from the passenger side 
of the vehicle, if there was another car less than 50 
feet in front of him. 
There was no crime, intent, damage, loss, trespass of 
another's rights, no one was endangered. 
The 55 mph speed limit on Interstate Highways was and is 
unconstitutional. It violates the rights of the reasonable 
and prudent citizens and violates the Utah Code 41-6-47, 48 
whereby the posted speed is to be determined by an engineering 
investigation. The posted speed should be established as the 
85 percentile of the speed traveled by the highway users. 
The harassment of the people, the cost of their time, 
anguish, delays and costs for setting the dispute have cost 
them many tens of millions of dollars annually. 
The difference between 55 mph and 65 mph is 18 percent 
and the difference between 55 mph and 70 mph is 27 percent. 
This loss in efficiency, according to many economists, was a 
major contributor to the United States' economic slump and not 
being competitive in the world market. Thanks to our 
government and our courts. 
The Appellant acts as a matter of right according to the 
doctrine enumerated by Hale v. Hinkle, Thompson v. Smith and 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins. The creatures created by the State act 
as a matter of privilege and are totally subject to the whims 
of the State, legislatures and police power; civilly and 
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criminally. 
6. The court and the prosecutor demonstrated no interest in the 
fact of the case or that justice be served. To all 
appearances, their interest was to teach the Appellant a 
lesson and get him back into the flock or into jail, and they 
did not seem to care which. 
7. Due process was denied the Appellant at almost every point 
from the stop to the Sentence Hearing. 
8. The Appellant's rights "Sua Sponti," demand for Counsel of 
Choice, right to a reliable witness and case law supporting 
his position were all denied by the courts. 
9. The Judge's handling of the void dire of the prospective 
jurors was a violation of every principle of fairness and 
decency, notwithstanding due process. 
10. The list of violations of the Appellant's rights as set forth 
in the provisions of the Utah State Constitution include more 
than half of the 27 sections of Article I. 
11. Many other state supreme courts have ruled that prima facie 
evidence that a driver exceeded the posted speed limit is not 
proof that he drove unreasonably or imprudently. Speed alone 
is not proof that he drove unreasonably or imprudently. 
It appears to the Appellant, that his government has, or think 
they have, reduced the citizens of this country to the rank of 
surfs, peons and servants and that they must be subservient to 
their masters, the government. 
Our public servants are ordering us around as if we were a 
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herd of sheep. They enter our legislature and tell how much we 
will pay them in taxes. 
Our lawyers, officers of the court, have also entered our 
legislatures en masse to determine our laws and statutize our every 
move and make laws to punish us if we question them or their 
actions. 
Apparently, we, the citizens, have slept too long. It is now 
up to our courts to give us back our unalienable rights and 
immunities we once had. 
Submitted this 21 day of October, 1988. 
Respectf ull^xours, 
CO 
,. D. Baker 
In Propria Persona 
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